Political Identity in the European Union.

By Daniel Dunne. January 1997
M.A. in European Studies, University College Dublin 1996/97.

Introduction:
The process of European integration raises many issues concerning identity. Europe has been called a 'part-formed polity' and at this point is on the verge of taking over some of the domain traditionally monopolised by the constituent nation-states. In order to maintain legitimacy a large degree of affective allegiance is necessary through identification with the political community that the putative supranational state represents. In this paper I intend to distinguish political identity as a special form of identity. I will examine the expression of political identity in its current form as nationalism, with special attention to the distinction between the 'German' and 'French' models of nationalism. I also intend to examine the place of political identity in ideological mindsets or worldviews whilst maintaining an awareness of the particular problems that the study of ideology raises. From these inquiries I hope to reach some useful conclusions about the ideological coherence, and the practical feasibility of a much strengthened European political identity.

The Nation State Supreme:
This present situation emerges out of a context where there has been 'relative congruity between bounded territory, functional tasks and a shared identity'(Laffan, 1996). The ideology of nationalism, as commonly understood, asserts that humankind is naturally divided into cultural units- or 'peoples'. These distinct communities should be represented or embodied in a single, sovereign and territorially integrated state. A key aspect of the ideology for this study is its political nature, that is, it implies an attitude of allegiance towards a particular state. In fact, nationalism as a phenomenon first arose as an expression of antipathy towards a particular type of state system, the ancient regime (Breuilly 1982). So nationalism involves political identity. Whatever the validity of nationalism as an ideology, one of the outcomes of nationalism in practice has been a lot of conflict: territorial disputes concerning rightful boundaries, wars of secession by minorities, competition for scarce resources on the basis of nationality, etc.. One of the motivations behind the European project has also been an attempt to save Europe from the ravages of national conflict that cost it so dearly in two world wars. In recent times supporters of the European project have realised the limits of co-operation on instrumental goals as a basis for a European identity. The idea of fostering a stronger European identity is mooted more and more frequently as a desirable soothing factor on the path to integration. Specifically a stronger European political identity would play a major role in legitimising a European supra-national state system, that is, a switch of allegiance from the constituent nation states to a new collective state and the community represented therein. A total switch of allegiance is not sought as it is unlikely in the foreseeable future that the nation states would be asked to dissolve themselves completely. How is such a switch of allegiance likely to happen? As a starting point to answering that question we need to examine nationalist ideology a little further.

Two Paradigms of Nationalism:

A key feature of nationalism for this study is its close association ideologically and in European history with the concept of popular sovereignty. This was especially true of nationalism in revolutionary France We have here what may be called the French tradition of nationalism, as opposed to the German tradition. The 'German' type of nationalism owes more to Herder and Romanticism. The volk is seen as an almost metaphysical entity - a community based on common language - which has a historic destiny to found its own state in its fatherland. This type of nationalist ideology places less emphasis on popular sovereignty than the French. This is an important distinction as we shall see later. Of course the German and French typologies here represent ideal types. In effect this distinction is drawn to highlight two very different forms of political identity. Anthony D. Smith has argued that the 'French' and 'German' concepts of nation are not separate in common parlance, however I agree with Ole Waever attempts (1993) to disentangle the two meanings. He calls them: civic state-nation and organic people nation. Indeed I believe that this distinction is ideologically coherent, but has been blurred by the way nations have historically developed. ( An interesting facet of the development of nationalism is that one nationally defined state clearly bounded presupposes another generating a kind of domino effect. The assertion of identities provokes the assertion of counter-identities.) Below I hope to assess of the German and French paradigms of political identity respectively assessing their usefulness in the search for a stronger European identity.

A European Cultural Identity?

One method applicable to the search for a stronger European identity involves seeking to emphasise a European cultural identity. This basically accepts the premise of 'German' paradigm that political identity should reflect cultural identity . The state should be contiguous with a cultural unit. Obviously Europe does not represent a common linguistic community This functions as a major obstacle to the 'intense interaction' that some believe could foster a shared identity. A rather obtuse form of commonality can be gleaned from the fact that most Europeans speak languages derived from Indo-European. A seldom-noted related phenomenon is the concordance between myth and folklore systems in the Indo-European line. Perhaps this gives Europeans common ground at some subconscious level (cf. works by Joseph Campbell, Mircea Eliade, Bruno Bettelheim, Carl Jung, etc.). However, as I will argue in respect of other issues, the universal commonality in this area is much more obvious to me, by which I mean the concordances between all world myth systems. Also I believe the rational element of consciousness is more relevant to our task.
Not only is there a lack of common language, but Europe lacks common memories and traditions of the type that would compete with the national: 'There is no European analogue to Bastille or Armistice day, no European ceremony for the fallen in battle, no European shrine of kings or saints. When it comes to the ritual and ceremony of collective identification there is no European equivalent of national or religious community.' (Smith,1992)

Cultural Identity as Metaphysics:

So seekers of a common European cultural identity must resort to other elements of culture. Most often they follow the orientation towards the past in the 'German' tradition, and seek a common heritage. The heritage alluded to, however, is usually of an abstract, if not metaphysical nature. Vaclav Havel (1994) exemplifies this approach: 'The European Union is based on a large set of values, with roots in antiquity and in Christianity which over 2.000 years evolved into what we recognise today as the foundations of modern democracy the rule of law and civil society. This set of values has its own clear moral foundation and its obvious metaphysical roots, regardless of whether modern man admits it or not.' Gerard Delanty (1995) takes a more negative view, arguing for instance that 'racism lay at the very core of European identity' and that 'the idea of Europe cannot be separated from European fascism and its myth of the unity of Europe...nor from the Holocaust.' Both of the above approaches are misplaced in my view, and confused. One source of the confusion is the notion that there is actually an entity - Europe - which can be judged in positive or negative light. This linguistic abstraction leads the theorist into a category error. 'Europe' refers to an array of phenomena so complex and vague in content as to defy simplistic embracing or rejection. It is plausible to look at particular cultural traditions and assess their content and their consequences. Thus we can share in Havel's celebration of certain positive values and metaphysical roots. But they are not Europe. It is doubtful if they are shared by all Europeans. Furthermore, although they first arose in Europe, they have been promulgated beyond Europe. A more important point however is the failure here to distinguish within the vague notion of 'culture' between ethico-political culture and the type of attributes such as linguistic particularity that were used to distinguish the cultural identity of nations. The recourse to ethico-political culture as a form of cultural identity is also mistaken here because the values described are universal in scope. In fact their revolutionary nature resides in their universality. They are universal in application, espoused with a view to universal application and potentially may be universally adopted. (I will argue further below that they represent a logical stage in the development of individuals and societies.)
The most that the project of a European cultural identity can draw from the celebration of these values is dubious pride in the facts of their historical origin on the European continent. To return to Delanty's critical analysis: once again European culture is assessed is a single entity, rendering a poverty of argument. Delanty fails to distinguish the complex and differentiated nature of European ethico-political world-views, and their complex interaction with actual events and with other elements in culture. For instance, despite some deference to the Frankfurt schools critique of instrumental rationality (Adorno and Horkheimer) there is a conflation in Delanty's thought of ethical, economic, technical and economic areas of culture. This leads to wholesale judgement of the baby-with -the-bathwater variety. Dialectic of Enlightenment, for Delanty, questions 'the very possibility of a European identity in the wake of the holocaust'. This is not the case. Adorno and Horkheimer critique the negative potential of certain cultural patterns ( a critique carried on by Habermas) but do not see them as metaphysically bound to Europe. Delanty suffers from the mistakenly positing Europe as a single metaphysical entity. Is it not possible to simply see Europe as a complex mixture of moral and cultural phenomena? Europe is neither inherently progressive nor inherently dominating. Wholesale judgement can go anywhere. For example, Morin's argument (1987) that Europe can be defined in terms of its 'self criticism', generates a conclusion completely at odds with Delanty's.

Dangerous Dichotomies:

The latter does however point out one of the most serious limitations of culture as a resource of identity, namely the 'dichotomy of Self and Other' (1995) . The concept of 'us' presupposes 'them'. Anthony D. Smith (1992) makes the same observation: 'Identities...are in fact often forged through oppositions to the identities of significant others, as the history of paired conflict so often demonstrates.' Binary juxtapositions develop, the Other being stereotyped as the shadow of the Self. I use of the Jungian term here to convey the concept of projection. Thus the assignation of the attribute 'civilised' to the Self - to take a very European example presupposes the assignation of , say, 'savage' to the Other. Countless other oppositions suggest themselves, i.e. Christian/Pagan, advanced/primitive, modern/backward etc. The dangers are obvious, threatening the type of conflict outlined above that the 'European Project' seeks to avoid. Delanty claims that 'European identity is becoming a white bourgeois populism defined in opposition to the Muslim world and the Third World.' !n similar vein, Habermas writes of the 'chauvinism of prosperity' (1992).
I hope I have shown clearly here the limits of cultural identity as a source from which to draw a stronger European political identity. One of Delanty's strengths is the attention he draws to a positive universalist enlightenment tradition, to which we now turn.

Sovereignty .

As I stated earlier , the 'French' paradigm of nationalism emphasises popular sovereignty in contrast to the emphasis on common culture in the German paradigm. Sovereignty was not vested in the King and coming from God, it came from below. In theory the sovereignty of the new democratic state was derived from the people, as is explicitly stated in many democratic constitutions. Significantly, the sovereignty element theoretically superseded the idea of an exclusive community. Popular sovereignty was closely connected with a declaration of the equality of all men,( no one thought to include women). Thus as Habermas points out, 'the initial fusion of Republicanism with nationalism only functioned as a catalyst...citizenship was never conceptually tied to national identity'(1992). Habermas also makes a point highly relevant to the immigration debate:

'...Citizen rights guarantee liberty because they contain a core composed of universal human rights. Article 4 of the Revolutionary Constitution of 1793, which defined the status of the citizen, gave to every* adult foreigner who lived for one year in France not just the right to remain within the country but also the active rights of the citizen.' (*sic)

The idea of popular sovereignty is related to enlightenment theories of a social contract made in a counterfactual state of nature (Rousseau). Thus sovereign individuals come together and agree to pool their sovereignty in a state system. The state's raison d'être is the protection of the citizens' rights and welfare and to protect itself as their representative system. This counterfactual situation may be abstract and imaginary, but allegiance to a state involves just these imaginative qualities as a reason for the 'benevolence' described by Howe (1995). Now the theory of sovereignty was applied in the historic situation it met with e.g. existing states and their apparatuses, administrative areas and economically functional areas. In fact centralisation of the state and more uniform domains was among the incipient factors to nationalism's rise (Breuilly 1982, Habermas 1992). So historically, simplifying a complex development here, popular sovereignty has been exercised in the nation-state. I contend here that this was not because the nation, an exclusive community, was inherent to the enlightenment concept of popular sovereignty but because of the outcome of political action, that complex nexus between ideology and the historic reality with which it meets. To expand: in a real as opposed to counterfactual situation the actors deciding how to pool their sovereignty have very limited choice as to which state to offer their allegiance. To relate this to the present situation in the European union we now face a situation where theoretically sovereign actors have a choice as to where to place their allegiance. This I believe is a rare historical circumstance. It is a choice as to which arena is best in which to exercise sovereignty, that is to seek to control the collective destiny of one's chosen community.

Sovereignty in the European Union

An application of the sovereignty model to the current situation yields some food for thought. As I understand it sovereignty has up to now been exercised mostly via the nation states. The exception to this is the small but increasing amount of powers vested in the European Parliament (EP). The EP represents a direct exercise of sovereignty; in other words, it is at only one representative remove from the citizens. Thus the nation states ( through the Commission and Council) have been pooling what I shall call borrowed sovereignty. Interestingly this means that a transfer of power from the Commission and Council to the EP represents a return of sovereignty closer to the citizens. Effectively I am highlighting the democratic deficit here. Low turnouts in EP elections represent its lack of real powers. An empowered EP would not only raise electoral interest but would sustain a stronger 'public realm'. Citizens across the union would divide on the basis of political programmes rather than on the second-hand basis of national interest, as in the current situation as described by Laffan (1996). An EP legislating in areas of relevance to the daily lives of citizens would stimulate the 'continuous free debate between opposing social forces' called for by the German Constitutional Court. A further device that would help this process would be a provision for Union-wide referenda. It will be clear that this argument supports Laffan's espousal (1996) of 'embedding the civic dimension of nationhood in a European-wide political process'. This echoes Weaver's idea (1993) of a 'political state identity along French lines'. The idea of sovereignty is a key concept in building this form of political identity, in particular its inherent idea of control over one's own destiny through the creative primacy of democratic politics. The dominance, so far, of economic integration and of the Monnet method, has constituted a disempowerment of citizens. Along with this is the hegemony of economics as an ideology (in the pejorative sense) presenting economic developments as pre-determined, natural and thus beyond the scope of valued judgements and the control of a collective political will (Habermas 1972, Hodgson 1983). The project of developing a more direct exercise of sovereignty presents enormous difficulties however, constituting in effect a frontal challenge to the political elites of the member states.

Sovereignty and Universal Identity:

In positing sovereignty's relevance for sustaining a European political identity we have overlooked its universalist tendencies which we treated of above. In my interpretation of the Republican idea of Sovereignty above there is an implied notion of universal identity, closely connected with the espousal of universal equality. For some this ideal has self-evident validity. I would also contend that it is supported by a range of attributes which can be identified as common to all humanity. One of the most important attributes is that of language itself. Chomsky has pointed to a 'universal grammar'. More significantly in the political sphere Habermas and others use the context of language as a basis for a rationale of judging 'truth-claims'. Habermas also points to the development of a world-wide communicative arena (1992). That said, a more precise definition of statehood would highlight areas where there are already impulses towards internationalised governance, for example: increased intervention of the international community in 'domestic' human rights situations, external policing, peace making etc. There is also the phenomenon of economic globalisation. These developments, for me call for the renovation and globalisation of the concept of popular sovereignty. 'State citizenship and world citizenship form a continuum which already shows itself, at least, in outline form'.(Habermas, 1992).

Identity and Decisions

To return to political identity: In a counter-factual state of nature the establishment of a world state would be a logical expression of a universalist sovereignty. But this seems less than realistic. The actor with a global identity must also address practical functional issues. Thus decisions regarding allegiance to a state structure, such as those taken by voters in the maastricht referenda involve not just the application of what I shall call a worldview (ethico-political paradigms and level of identity extension) but also pragmatic means/ends reasoning. For the actor with a global identity, Europe could seem like a logical arena where the opportunity of a larger political identity presents itself: an economically integrated area calling for parallel political integration, and sovereign control. There might also be the possibility of influencing world affairs for the better through collective organs. However other factors could come into play. Maastrict was presented as a package deal: policies and the procedures of governance all rolled in. Then there is the possible outcomes to be gauged from the addition of would be members. Decisions of political identity become enmeshed with programmatic interests. ( I have not tried in this paper to excavate the general relationship between identity and interests: rational-self /national / global /class / 'emancipatory'.)
It should be clear from this that any analysis of opposition tendencies has a lot to take account of. Some opposition may be of a 'rightist' nature (inclusive identity based). some may be the result of pragmatic calculations by actors with a global mindset. The Irish case may have been different from the cases outlined by Laffan(1996) in that immigration was not a key issue. My own recollection is that a significant element of opposition came from critics with globalist world-views, for example the Green Party and left-wing critics like Michael D Higgins. (The correlation between the holding of a degree and opposition to Europe fails to hold up in this case ! That such an academic categorisation is used in polling instruments by academics, displays a degree of superficiality which I hope to address below.)

Ideology and Identity, a Speculation.

Much of the writing on identity in Europe is unsystematic. Little clarity is brought to concepts such as identity and culture. Furthermore the complexity of the phenomenon of ideology itself is seldom addressed. Ideology is perhaps the fulcrum on which the debate about the epistemology of the social sciences turns.( C.f. Habermas, Ricoeur, Gadamer and others).The view I have taken on this debate myself generates the conclusion that there is no objective standpoint from which the theorist can appraise ideology, nor can he or she simply morally equate the claims of rival ideologies, thus hiding behind another ideology, that of relativism. In mind of this I believe there is a qualitative distinction between the two forms of identity I outlined above, the inclusive and the exclusive. The inclusive identity based on universal sovereignty is in my understanding a paradigm shift into a different world view. Ken Wilber (1996) makes a complex and convincing argument that universal identification is a potential stage in the ethico-political development of all societies and individuals ( drawing on Kohlberg, Habermas and others).Wilber uses the type of holistic, inter-disciplinary method of inquiry which the study of ideology deserves. Those researching political identity as ideology need complex theoretical instruments, to distinguish these worldviews and also to distinguish pragmatic means/ends strategies. A recent example displays in my view a lack of critical depth. Richard Sinnott (1996) shows that of those in favour of EU enlargement there is a 59% ¾ 39% split between those who would continue their support if it meant fewer funds for Ireland, and those who would not. Sinnott relates this to the respondent's level of knowledge about the IGC. 'Such support is related to understanding what the EU is all about: it rises to 39% among those who know that the IGC is talking about the CFSP but falls to 23% among those who don't know this rather basic fact.'( my italics) Like in the application of academic categories above, there is a lack of any critical distance, generating an almost patronising tone. There is also a superficiality of analysis. That understanding leads to support is a causal link not demonstrated in the data. It may be the other way around, support motivating understanding, not to mention other variables not dealt with in the survey. Or it may involve the types of complex issues I have outlined above. Basically deeper questions need to be asked, (although ultimately the study of ideology brings us to the mysterious core of our humanity). An early example of social research into worldviews concerning identity and prejudice is The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et alia, 1950). Though not flawless this multidisciplinary work models the type of critical depth and analytical rigour which the study of ideology requires.

Conclusion:

I have tried in the above to examine political identity in the European context. I used the distinction between two traditions of political identity as expressed in 'German' and 'French' nationalism. I argued that the 'French' model, emphasising universal popular sovereignty was a greater potential resource in the search for a stronger European political identity. I maintained however that this would imply a project of democratisation, specifically an increase in the powers of the European Parliament, which could strengthen political discourse beyond national boundaries. I concluded with a speculative account of universal identity, and a look at some of the issues raised by the study of identity as ideology.
 

References:

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Thanks to: Fran, Mary and Theresa Dunne Senior; Gary Collins and Dr. Deirdre Murphy; Fiona Kenny and all in the SU; Anne O Neill; and all involved with the M.A., especially Brigid Laffan.