The Cultural Stereotype and the Other.
'In psychological terms, the stereotype is a necessary expression of collective identity, often confirming aggressive or defensive intent, but always confiscating the other.' Discuss in relation to the paradigms or examples of your choice.'
Introduction
In discussing the above statement many disciplines and paradigms can be invoked. Such an area of enquiry raises serious problems of method and epistemology. Any research in the human sciences raises these issues.[footnote 1] Above all it is necessary to be aware of the assumptions one brings to the task. The issue of stereotyping brings us into an arena of issues concerning equality and domination. Personally I am in agreement with the prevailing deference to egalitarian ideals, however I find it necessary to seek out a more self aware relationship with this viewpoint as opposed to blindly accepting some politically correct orthodoxy as an a priori starting point of enquiry. In other words, in discussing the social development of what I call moral-psychological world-views it is necessary to try and situate one's own.
Below I hope to argue that ( a ) the stereotype is not a necessary expression of collective identity, but is, however, a potential expression thereof ( b) that stereotypes often confirm aggressive or defensive intent, but can also exist in a neutral form ( c ) that theories of personal and human development can help to explain the phenomenon of stereotypes and ( d) that stereotypes function in such a way that they represent a closed and prejudiced approach to the other and in that sense always confiscate the other.
Potential or Necessary?
The term 'necessary' in the statement under discussion involves the type of
assumptions I have attempted to make explicit above: assumptions about psychology,
social processes and human nature; in effect, assumptions about the human condition.
The term 'necessary' here evokes notions of determinism which are, in my view,
at least questionable. I would like to argue that stereotypes are, rather, a
'potential' expression of identity. This notion of potentiality is presented
in the framework of a developmental view of human psychology, a framework simultaneously
embedded in a view of the human condition that recognises bounded contexts of
existence. It is argued that there is an open moment in the social process,
one albeit implicit and difficult to define.Developmental psychology rests on
the very notion of potentiality. Innate tendencies are postulated, which, given
congenial circumstances will come to fruition. Importantly, one of the key areas
in which development takes place is in the realm of identity. Moreover this
development of identity is dynamic. It involves the assertion of physical, psychological
and eventually intellectual separation all in a necessarily social context.
As I have intimated, the circumstances bear heavily on the outcome. Developmental
psychology is a vast area of enquiry but there are large areas of consensus.
For the purposes of this discussion I want to concentrate on issues of identity
and moral-psychological world-views. Here I am drawing on the work of Kohlberg,
Habermas and Loevinger[footnote 2]. The table below
illustrates some of the consensus.
|
LOEVINGER (self sense) |
KOHLBERG (moral sense) | |
| autistic | pre-moral
|
|
| symbiotic | ||
| beginning impulsive | 0 magic / wish | |
| impulsive | PRE-CONVENTIONAL | 1 punishment/obedience |
| self-protective | 2 naive hedonism | |
| conformist | CONVENTIONAL | 3 approval of others |
| conscientious-conformist | 4 law and order | |
| conscientious | POST-CONVENTIONAL
|
5 individual rights |
| individualistic | 6 individual principles of conscience | |
| autonomous | ||
| integrated | 7 universal |
Adapted from Ken Wilber, A Brief History of Everything.
In interpreting the above it should be noted that these are idealised stages of development. As Wilber[footnote 3] states:
'Even in stronger versions such as Kohlberg's, the self at any given point in its development will tend to give around 50 percent of its responses from one level, 25 percent from a level above that, and 25 percent from a level below it....There are all sorts of regressions, spirals, temporary leaps forward, peak experiences and so on.'
The salient point to be drawn from the above is the distinction between pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional stages. It should be apparent that the conventional stage generates the greatest potential for stereotyping. To put it simplistically, the self is identified with the group at this stage. As Wilber says, this stage tends to be 'very ethnocentric'. He refers to mythic membership. 'Care and concern are extended to believers in the same mythology, the same ideology, the same race, the same creed, the same culture - but no further.'[.1]
The transition to the post-conventional stage rests on the development of the capacity for introspection. One can begin to judge the roles and rules which had previously been swallowed without reflection. The self is no longer identified with the group but can criticise it. Wilber sees this as a progression from sociocentric to worldcentric.
This paradigm shift from conventional to post-conventional bears greatly on the issues under discussion. It is because this shift is not assured that there is a potential for the predominance of stereotyping. Below I hope to examine the factors that dynamically interact with this psychological development, the 'bounded contexts' of existence which I referred to above.
Firstly however I will give an account of the application of the developmental model to empirical studies of prejudice.
Authoritarianism and Development
The study of prejudice is directly relevant to the study of stereotypes, pejorative stereotypes being almost synonymous with prejudice. It is also the case that prejudice has been, since World War Two an area of much empirical research. The ground-breaking work in the area, The Authoritarian Personality by Adorno[footnote 4] et alia is still the starting point. Adorno, the Frankfurt School philosopher with a rich theoretical synthesis of freudianism and Hegelian Marxism was joined by more empirically based researchers. The infamous F-scale was applied as an instrument to gauge personal tendencies towards fascism.
What emerged was a set of clusters of personality traits in the authoritarian which ultimately became a working definition of authoritarianism for subsequent researchers.[footnote 5]These traits were as follows:
Conventionalism: Rigid adherence to middle-class values.
Authoritarian Submission: Submissive, uncritical attitude toward idealised moral authorities of in-group.
Authoritarian Aggression: Tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate conventional values.
Anti-intraception: Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the tender-minded.
Superstition and Stereotypy: Belief in mystical determinants of the individual's fate; the disposition to think in rigid categories.
Power and Toughness; Pre-occupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension; identification with power figures; exaggerated assertions of strength and toughness.
Destructiveness and Cynicism.: Generalised hostility, vilification of the human.
Projectivity: Disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go in the world; the projection outwards of unconscious emotional impulses.
Sex: Ego-alien sexuality; exaggerated concern with sexual "goings on," and punitiveness toward violators of sexual mores.
Some of these features will be of relevance in my discussion below about bounded contexts.
However here I would like to outline the critique of this authoritarian theory of prejudice by the experimental social psychologist Frances Aboud[footnote 6].
The authoritarian theory explains negative attitudes in terms of states internal to the child. Conflict between what the child wants and what is available leads to anger. Unless parents help the child express this anger in modified and controlled ways, it will be displaced onto outsiders who are less powerful and less known than one's parents. Unless the child integrates both the good and the bad in herself, the bad parts will be projected onto unknown and powerless people. The theory emphasises that anger and defence mechanisms associated with anger are the sources of prejudice, and that authoritarian childrearing practises produce this negative outcome[footnote 7]. Aboud looks at the empirical literature and shows that the authoritarian theory is weak in that while it 'provides a great deal about the childhood antecedents of prejudice, it makes no distinction between the prejudices of a child and those of an adult'.[footnote 8]It emphasises the stability of prejudice and is not concerned with the impact of developmental changes. In an exhaustive survey of empirical data Aboud concludes that authoritarian childrearing cannot, on it's own, explain prejudice.
'There is no evidence for such a relation here, except in adolescent boys. There is somewhat more support for the variables thought to mediate this relation, such as self esteem and the need for approval.'
Interestingly, the juncture of adolescence coincides with the transition from the conventional/sociocentric stage outlined above. Need for approval is also related to developmental stages. I will endeavour to tease out the implications of all this below. I will also treat of low self esteem (an indicator of shame) in the context of development. For Aboud, authoritarian upbringing does contribute to prejudice by 'making the child more dependent on ethnocentric parents and possibly by lowering the child's self esteem'.[footnote 9] Other factors such as I.Q. (which is significant in itself and also for lowering self-esteem) and peer group come into play.
Aboud goes on to argue for a social cognitive developmental theory, which explains the striking changes in attitudes around age seven that are recorded in experiment after experiment. These coincide with the transition from pre-conventional to conventional stages outlined above.
Interestingly the research outlined records significant instances of negative self evaluation, for instance among American minority children who prefer white dolls in doll tests[footnote 10]. A parallel, if more extreme and tragic, phenomenon is that of internalisation of shame by some survivors of the death camps, leading them to verbally abuse their children in the same racist terms with which they themselves had been abused. This is an example of that sick shame dynamic which Bruno Bettelheim (psychologist and survivor of the camps) described as identification with the offender.
To summarise, experimental social psychology tends to support, in my view, the application of a developmental model to account for pejorative stereotyping. However an overarching account is still some way off.
It is useful at this point to note another finding from social psychology. Lack of information contributes to the use of stereotypes, which would confirm common-sense intuition, likewise if information is too extensive to process efficiently[footnote 11]. This supports the position that stereotypes can be neutral as opposed to being of aggressive or defensive intent. For instance, I have no charged attitude towards Eskimos but through lack of knowledge my perception is reduced to that of a stereotype.
At this stage it is perhaps timely to move on from the limited domain that is empirical social psychology, and make use of a more interpretative method.
Bounded Contexts[footnote 12]
Human development takes place in bounded contexts. Along with the hermeneutic contexts of the human condition presented by Gadamer[footnote 13] such as linguisticality and historicality are a range of contexts which operate dynamically on the developmental process at both micro and macro levels. Among the most important I can postulate here are those I will call economy, coercion and shame.
Economy is basically the characteristic of inhabiting a life-world where desired and necessary goods are limited in supply. On a micro level this involves the dependency of the child on the parent for all material and emotional needs (with potentially radical effects on core beliefs or 'primal maps'). On a larger scale it involves interdependence within communities (Elias' chain of relations). It also involves competition between large social actors (Marx: capital and labour) and of course competition for economic goods between nations. By viewing this single characteristic across these levels we can begin to theorise about what I shall call primal precursors to ideology. A dynamic interrelationship can be deduced between processes producing ideology on the various levels. Child rearing begins in a social situation situated in the actual economy and is influenced by this. It is also influenced by prevailing ideology about scarcity and economy. The developed child becomes an actor and a new input to the cultural system. Another element in this is that core ideological beliefs about scarcity and economy will influence explicit ideology and ultimately outcomes within the actual economy, and possibly the systematic rationale of the economic system.
Coercion, is the characteristic of inhabiting a lifeworld where one is vulnerable to physical coercion, that is violence from others. Violence, or the threat of it is often the ultimate basis of power[footnote 14], and is intrinsic to the maintenance of the legal authority of the state. On the micro level it involves the vulnerability of the child to immeasurably stronger adults. It involves the vulnerability of the citizen to state and illegal violence. On a larger scale it involves the vulnerability of group actors, e.g. classes and ultimately it involves states being prey to the organised violence that is war.
Once again the various levels dynamically interact, as it were, with two-way feedback loops. Actual violence interacts with core beliefs about violence, or primal precursors to ideology. Included in the latter are beliefs about dominance and submission, power and toughness those variables that we saw as being inherent to Adorno's portrait of the authoritarian personality above. An important observation to make at this point is that these characteristics, and the one following (shame), stem from the inescapable context that is our physicality. This line of contact between physicality and ideology has received little attention.[footnote 15]
An attempt at a schematic explanation of the suggested dynamics that form a
context to stereotyping.
| characteristics | dynamics | at various system/ | levels | |||
| DYNAMICS | ||||||
| macro level : global-geo-political system |
meso level : national/class system |
micro level : family systems |
||||
| economy | scarcity | scarcity | scarcity | |||
| exploitation | exploitation | deprivation | ||||
| competition | interdependence | dependency | ||||
| coercion | state vs state | state/ vs person etc | adult vs child | |||
| shame | hegemony | shame | ||||
| CONSCIOUSNESS | ||||||
| macro | meso | micro | ||||
| ideology | ideology | -primal maps | ||||
| Red lines indicating some of the feedback loops/inter-relationships are not shown in HTML version. | ||||||
Shame
Little attention has been given to the role of shame in reproducing stereotypes. Indeed shame has achieved little prominence in psychological, social-psychological or sociological discourse[footnote 16]. The theory of shame that supports this analysis draws on the discourse of the popular 'adult-child-recovery' movement which combines family systems theory, and a psychodynamic view of childhood informed by concepts such as abuse, co-dependency and shame itself[footnote 17]. Here I am postulating vulnerability to shame as another bounded context of development, relevant across the micro/macro divide. It is necessary to briefly define shame. As opposed to guilt, which is a painful emotion associated with the transgression of a moral injunction, shame is closer to a pervasive feeling of unworthiness or worthlessness, a sense of being inherently defective. Shame functions to block and to bind. John Bradshaw [footnote 18]outlines the process of childhood shaming and its effects, and supports this with research which shows that the resultant primal mapping (which I have read as a primal precursor to ideology) is mirrored in neurological imprinting. According to Bradshaw all human powers can be shamed, including powers that are perceptual, imaginative, intellectual, emotional and volitional. The body, which houses these powers is also at the mercy of shame.[footnote 19]Shame binds needs and drives. Thus shame is, in Sheff's words, the master emotion.
Shame is interpersonal as well as intrapersonal. Scheff[footnote 20] argues that shame functions in a deference-emotion system in which conformity to exterior norms is rewarded by deference and feelings of pride, and nonconformity is punished by lack of deference and feeling of shame. It is a biosocial system of social control that functions continuously and virtuously invisibly.
On a larger scale shame maintains stratification[footnote 21] and legitimates domination. It is a key element I believe in the process that Gramsci describes as cultural hegemony (a concept applied by Edward Said[footnote 22]). Moreover, shame, like coercion and economy, operates dynamically between the interdependent micro and macro levels of an interconnected social system. As process sociology argues (Elias and followers) the group, or the nation, as long as there is a perceived common identity, has its own emotional body and is prone to shame.
A key related process to that of shame is that of projection. Because what is shamed cannot be owned, it is projected as shadow. What we hate most is what has been most shamed in ourselves, be it laziness, slovenliness, weakness[footnote 23] or diverse inclinations. So shamed traits are projected.
Moreover, the individual shamed in society brings the shame home to his children, a process expertly described by Joyce in Counterparts.[footnote 24]The inter-personal transfer of shame is the cement of power. Shame can be likened to a commodity with an economy of its own; when an individual or group is overloaded with this painful commodity it often seeks to unload it onto a vulnerable individual or group. Without a fundamental change in primal core beliefs (various therapies are prescribed) shame seeks out a scapegoat. Thus, shame itself is projected.
Shame and Ideology.
Another process is the translation of shame into explicit ideology. Core beliefs about human nature are especially relevant here. These impact greatly on explicit political ideology, on political action and ultimately on actual political outcomes. It is important to note at this point the role of shame in received narratives of long historical standing. I am referring here to the impact of dominant theologies in the West, which in my view have been instrumental in reproducing shame. Theologian Matthew Fox[footnote 25]distinguishes in the history of western theology and popular spirituality two opposed traditions, one being creation-centred, the other based on a fall/redemption narrative. The latter tradition which has been in the ascendant focuses on Saint Augustine's concept of original sin. Humanity is inherently flawed in this view as is the material world. Concomitant with this is the shaming of pleasure, especially erotic pleasure, and the result of pleasure, that is gestation and birth (Note the concordances once again with the 'authoritarian' personality). In lacking a via positiva the fall/redemption tradition results in seeing woman as impure and natural inclinations, e.g. those of children, as in need of 'breaking'. The impact for shame in society should be apparent. The rival creation-centred tradition became marginalised. A representative figure would be Meister Eckhart. Ironically, in my understanding, many of the propositions of creation centred theology filtered through into secular movements, and contributed to the impetus of the enlightenment. (A paper by Dr Gerard Hanratty[footnote 26] of UCD traces the filtration of the thirteenth century Eckhart's thought down through Marx and Hegel and others, albeit in an attempt to discredit him as a 'mystical atheist').
Beyond this we can observe that shame is intimately linked to the characteristics above. Core shame-related beliefs impinge hugely on beliefs about economy and coercion. If weakness is shamed then defeat by physical coercion is all the more anathema, as is loss in the economy if poverty is shamed.
As I have said these contexts bound development. Let me expand. As we noted earlier the stages of development represent ideal types. the journey is fraught with the vulnerabilities I describe above. Specifically because development depends on certain dependency needs being met, deprivation (economy) is an initial threat. Shame is likewise a threat because it blocks the free expression of the faculties involved in development. It is worth emphasising that progression is a process of individuation (to use Jung's term) and of separation, while simultaneously being an expansion of identity. In summary, shame is relevant to the stereotyping process because it serves to induce conformity to the group, impedes the self's development to a post-conventional world-view and because finally, when out of hand, it entails the process of projection of shamed traits and shame itself on a collective level.
The German Case
It is to be hoped that the broad lines of this theory have some prima facie coherence. What follows is an attempt to apply my speculations to the case of the scapegoating and pejorative stereotyping of Jews in the German case.
The role of shame is apparent in that Germany as a nation was shamed by defeat in the Great War, particularly painful because of the erstwhile primacy of Prussian military values, which associated defeat with shame. This went along side a popular cult of male strength linked with honour, as seen in duelling tradition of the student Korps[footnote 27], a tradition premised on shame if ever there was one.
'The characteristic which singles out academic youth as a social group (Stand) from the rest of society, is the concept of 'Satisfaktionsfähigkeit' [the acceptability as a challenger in duels], i.e. the claim to a specific socially defined standard of honour (Standesehre).'[footnote 28]
But, if Scheff is correct, this phenomenon mirrors a deeper and more pervasive strand on the macro-cultural level. He interprets the 'bizarre and highly self-destructive' behaviour of France and Germany in terms of a duel-like interaction-ritual between the two countries:
'French and German politics and diplomacy from 1870-1945 appear to be extremely irrational and perhaps may be understood as a character contest, even at the risk of self-destruction.'[footnote 29]
This is a manifestation of the 'emotion-deference system', which 'as represented in the sequence of honour, insult, revenge, may decide the fate, not only of individuals, but of nations'.
'It is humiliations to a group, assaults on their honour and pride, which make them in turn, avenge themselves by humiliating the other group. The shame and rage gets passed on from generation to generation.'[footnote 30]
For Germany, this process includes the double ignominy of the Versailles settlement, a tangible reminder of defeat which also functioned to pressurise the economic variable through reparations and the loss of a scarce resource, the Alsace-lorraine. This economic pressure impacted right down to the micro level, in the forms of Weimar hyper-inflation and the post 1929 depression. This was exacerbated by the theologically informed Protestant work ethic. The general level of German shame and economic insecurity became unbearable. A suitable object for the projection of shame was required. It is not difficult to see why the available stereotype of the Jew was revived to new levels: the stereotype saw Jews as bleeding scarce resources through ingenuity rather than hard work. (Work-shyness, a shamed trait, could lead one to the camps regardless of ethnicity or sexual-orientation, hence the cynical injunction: "Arbeit Macht Frei") Dirtiness, associated with eastern Jews was a trait deeply shamed early in life. The extremes of scapegoating need a deeper explanation, however. The work of Alice Miller in relating child rearing methods to political violence is relevant in the explanation.[footnote 31] It is too simplistic to say that Hitler's childhood was responsible. The childhood of a Hitler or a Ceaucescu serves only as being representative, the tip of the iceberg of a mass psychological phenomenon. An almost contemporary attempt to give a mass psychological account was made by Wilhelm Reich[footnote 32]. This complex account highlights the deep shame of instinctual life which I pinpointed above as being crucial. Reich critiques Weineger on this point. In fact Reich led a massive organisation dedicated to non-repressive sexual education in pre-1933 Germany[footnote 33].
Conclusion
I have attempted to argue that pejorative stereotyping is contingent on inherent developmental tendencies which interact dialectically with given characteristics of human existence. The upshot of all this is what I have called an open moment in the social process which renders stereotypes as potential, but not necessary expressions of identity. Stereotypes can exist in a neutral form, as the research of Rothbart et alia suggests, but more often stereotyping functions as an expression of the dynamics of economy, coercion and shame described above. In these contexts the stereotype is often confirmation of aggression and defensiveness of varying degrees. The degrees are mirrored by degrees of deviation in the content of the stereotype from a real and rational basis. In this case the stereotype confiscates the other as a function of cognitive closure.[footnote 34] Limits of space have prevented a more thorough teasing out of the dynamics involved in all of this. It is possible however to draw a conclusion from the forgoing. To return to a point in the introduction, it is necessary to bring to awareness the process that leads the individual towards an egalitarian and universalist world-view. The developmental model provides us a starting point. According to Wilber 'the capacity for postconventional and worldcentric pluralism is a very rare, very elite accomplishment.' For Wilber it is important to qualitatively distinguish between different worldviews. Every person is equal but not every stance is equal.
'[Multiculturalists] know they have a noble stance...but because they don't understand how they got there, they simply try to force their view down everybody's throat. Everybody is equal, no moral stance is better than another! And so off we go with vicious intolerance in the name of tolerance, with censorship in the name of compassion, with we-know-best thought police and mindless political correctness...'
To this controversial statement let me add my personal view. Pejorative stereotyping is a disposition arising from a persistent and pervasive habitus[footnote 35]. That habitus, I have argued, is based on vulnerabilities to coercion, competitive economy and shame. But it is not a sealed determination. There is an open moment, a window however slight to transcendence, which presents us a relative degree of choice, and thus a challenge. The challenge is to promote an alternative to the authoritarian habitus, to foster, in a deep sense, the perennial ideal that some have called equality, and yet others, love.
Footnotes
1. An extensive literature exists. See for example Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. (1981) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. I am particularly influenced by Ken Wilber's synthesis of these in A Brief History of Everything (Dublin: Gill & MacMillan 1996) which postulates further, more spiritual, realms of consciousness.
4. Adorno, T.W., Frenken-Brunswick, E., Levinson, D.J. and Sandford, R.N. (1950) The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper & Row.)
5. Kirscht & Dillehay, Dimensions of Authoritarianism, A Review of research and Theory 1967,University of Kentucky Press, Lexington
6. Frances Aboud, Children and Prejudice (1988) New York: Blackwell
10. Incidentally this research was used by civil rights lawyers when challenging segregated education in the U.S. as dramatised in the film Separate But Equal.
11. Rothbart et al., 1978. 'From individual to group impressions: Availability heuristics in stereotype formation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 14, 237-55.
12. Inevitably in such a interpretative venture, not being a hard science, my personal lifeworld and my subjective interpretation thereof will be an influence (or my 'prejudice' in Gadamer's non-pejorative sense of the word).
13. Gadamer,H.G. (1979) Truth and Method London: Sheed & Ward
14. Steven Lukes (1974) Power, A Radical View London: MacMillan
15. Notable exceptions are Reich (see below) and Alexander Lowen's Bio-energetics. Another work tangential to issues of shame and the body is Nancy M. Henley, Body politics, power, sex and non-verbal communication. (1986) New York: Simon & Schuster.
16. Notable exceptions being Thomas J. Schaeff, Microsociology: discourse, emotion and social structure (1990) Chicago: Chicago University Press; Helen Lynd, Shame and the Search for Identity (1958) New York: Harcourt Brace; and Henley op. cit.
17. Whitfield, Charles. 1991. Codependence, Healing the Human Condition (Deerfield Beach, FL: Health Communications) gives a good summary of the origins and development of the recovery field.
18. John Bradshaw, 1989 Healing the Shame that Binds You Health Communications, Deerfield Beach, FL
19. John Bradshaw, 1993 Creating Love (London; Piatkus) pp 56-109.
20. Thomas J. Scheff , 'Shame and Conformity: The Deference-Emotion System', American Sociological Review, 1988, Vol. 53 (June:395-406)
21. Scheff, op. cit., Kemper, Theodore D. (1977) A Social Interactional Theory of Emotions. New York: Wiley and Henley, op. cit.
22. See the Introduction to Orientalism by Edward Said.
23. Robert Bly, A Little Book About The Human Shadow
24. James Joyce, 1914. Dubliners
25. Matthew Fox (1983) Original Blessing San Francisco; Bear&Co
26. Dr Gerard Hanratty 'The Origins and Development of Mystical Atheism', photocopy in UCD library- I couldn't ascertain the title of the journal.
27. A tradition outlined in E.J. Hobsbawm The Invention of Tradition (1983) Cambridge, Cambridge UP. pp.297-8.
28. Günter Botzert quoted in Hobsbawm, op. cit., p. 298.
29. Thomas J. Scheff , 'Shame and Conformity: The Deference-Emotion System', American Sociological Review, 1988, Vol. 53 (June:395-406)
30. Scheff quoted in The New York Times , September 15, 1987.
31. Alice Miller, For Your Own Good, ...( 1983) New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux.
32. Reich, Wilhelm (1972) The Mass Psychology of Fascism. London: Souvenir Press.
33. Reich was originally in Freud's inner circle, splitting to promote his bio-energetic psychology. He major work Character Analysis was highly influential. He was one of the first to question Freud's suppression of child sexual abuse. His interests became more esoteric in post-war America, leading to a tragic end. See David Boadella's Wilhelm Reich: The Evolution of his Work.
34. John Bradshaw, Creating Love op. cit. passim.
35. Pierre Bordieu, (1990) In Other Words: Essays
Towards a Reflexive Sociology. Cambridge: Polity